



Qazi Hussain Asghar¹

¹Ex Civil Servant & Ph.D Scholar at Quaid-i-Azam University Islamabad.

KEYWORDS	ABSTRACT
Economic Interdependence, Economic Statecraft, Geoeconomics, Global Influence, Strategic Competition, State Power	Geoeconomics has become a critical aspects of state power in terms of economic ties and resource exchanges as countries increasingly rely on this to achieve strategic goals. The aim of this study was to analyze the influence of economic interdependence, geoeconomic tools, strategic competition, and international influence in the current international relations. The study used a qualitative descriptive research design, secondary-source analysis. Thirty scholarly and policy sources were purposefully chosen and coded using a thematic analysis. The results revealed six aspects of geoeconomic power. Geoeconomic instruments and strategic competition were mentioned in 27 sources (90.0%), and economic interdependence and strategic leverage in 24 sources (80.0%). 23 sources mention technology (76.7%) and 22 sources mention global influence via economic partnerships (73.3%) as critical supply chains of these sources. The critical supply chains identified within these sources include technology (23, 76.7%) and the influence of the global market via economic partnerships (22, 73.3%). Trade restrictions were mentioned in 24 sources (80.0%) and export and technology restrictions were mentioned in 23 sources (76.7%). The analysis additionally revealed that trade partnerships extended, technology cooperation emerged, and strategic partnerships in the supply chain emerged in 22 sources (73.3%), 21 sources (70.0%), and 21 sources (70.0%), respectively. The findings here show that states have increasingly become linked to the economic capabilities and strategic goals via policies related to trade, investment, finance, technology, energy, infrastructure and supply-chain. The study shows that economic interdependence can be viewed as a factor of cooperation as well as a tool of strategic leverage, thus geoeconomics growingly becoming a factor in state power and international influence.
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Corresponding Author	Qazi Hussain Asghar
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Introduction

Geoeconomics is becoming an increasingly important phenomenon in today's international relations and an increasing number of states are thus using their economic means to pursue their geopolitical and strategic interests. There is increasing convergence between economic policy, foreign policy and defence policy; the trade and industrial policy concept is new to international competition strategy, particularly for trade, investment, financing, technology, energy, and industrial policy. The research thrust of the times is now recognising the growing confluence of strategic affairs, technology, politics and economics as unique to the present-day context of 'geoeconomics' (Aggarwal-Cheung, 2024). Much more is involved when the economic instrument's meaning is more important than that it is tradeable: it can be important to trade or determine the ability of a state to exist, or sustain strategic industries in the international system. Such is the nature of these growing literatures that a case can be made that one of the important instruments assumed by states to pursue their national interests is the application of geoeconomics, including but not limited to, sanctions, trade and investment policies, and financial controls, and possibly industrial policies too.

Geoeconomic power goes hand-in-hand with economic interdependence. In today's globalised world, there are large networks and connections across the world tied together through the trade, financial, technological, production, and supply routes. The advantages of interdependence to both economies can make those in the positions of unequal access vulnerable or influential. The potential opportunity to gain information, limits access or charge costs to other actors requires that a position is strategic in an international economic network. Since recent times, the concept of economic networks has increasingly gained significance for the need of states to minimize external binding and to enhance their economic security (Aggarwal & Reddie, 2025). Therefore, economic interdependence can be a tool that could promote cooperation and at the same time be a lever of strategic advantage.

Research Background

Geoeconomics in the modern sense is tightly connected to the rise of economic statecraft in the era of strategic competition. In today's world of geoeconomics, there is close connection between the increased use of economic statecraft in the times of strategic competition. Increased interventions by the government in the market to limit export or impose restrictions, investments screen, limit trade and use of technology, and targeted investment policies. Steps – particularly in critical areas like semiconductors, telecom, advanced computing, energy and critical infrastructure – are more significant and evident. This has been explained by government as 'economic statecraft': the power of the government to shape the nature of the market to achieve an outcome in terms of national security and technological purposes (Aggarwal & Reddie, 2025). Financial capacities also are evolving as strategic, with states creating financial laws and using market access and their influence within key financial infrastructures to further support the wider geoeconomic objectives (James & Quaglia, 2025).

But economic interdependence and strategic competition does not stop at the cross over of the great powers. A less-focused economy of middle powers and developing economies that can go head-to-head with bigger economies that would provide them with investment opportunities, markets, technology, infrastructure, etc., and dependency. This recent research about South Asian region demonstrates how economic instruments are used in the processes of realizing states' strategic goals in a competitive regional macro-picture, under the Great Powers' desires. In recent literature analysing the Sino-Japanese relationship, the diffusion of force between regional competition and its permeation in the context of Sino-Japan trade, infrastructure and economic partnership is a notable phenomenon (Yan & Su, 2025). What is emerging from these developments is that geoeconomics policy is not confined to classic economic policy but rather a way to oversee interdependence, counter strategic competition and gain more leverage in the new global economic matrix.

Research Objectives

1. To examine the role of economic interdependence in strengthening state power and creating strategic leverage in international relations.
2. To analyze how states use geoeconomic instruments, including trade, investment, sanctions, technology controls, and financial policies, to pursue strategic interests.
3. To assess how geoeconomic strategies influence strategic competition and the capacity of states to expand their global influence.

Research Questions

Q1. How does economic interdependence contribute to state power and strategic leverage in international relations?

Q2. How do states use geoeconomic instruments to pursue strategic and geopolitical interests?

Q3. How do geoeconomic strategies shape strategic competition and global influence?

Significance of the Study

This study is significant because it contributes to understanding the changing relationship between economic capabilities and state power in contemporary international relations. By examining economic interdependence, strategic competition, and global influence together, the study provides a broader perspective on how states use economic instruments to pursue geopolitical objectives. It highlights the strategic importance of trade, investment, financial systems, technology, sanctions, and supply chains in shaping international relationships. The study can also support researchers, policymakers, and international affairs practitioners in understanding the opportunities and vulnerabilities created by economic interdependence. In addition, it provides a useful conceptual basis for examining how changing patterns of economic competition are influencing the structure of global power.

Literature Review

Geeconomics and the Changing Nature of State Power

The study of geeconomics is now a budding subject, in which the economic capacity, the geopolitical goals and the strategic competition overlap. For Mohr and Trebesch (2025) geeconomics is a linking point between economic policy and political power struggles, including sanctions and trade limitations, international financial sectors and capital movements, and geoeconomic risk and conflicts. Their evaluation reveals that economic instruments are increasingly making up part of the complete geopolitical instruments and not only economic ones. The current geoeconomic shift is served by Babić et al. (2024) who argue that it is the results of new state-firm-marks-tech-no-org interactions. They are particularly interested in the absence of the traditional notion of 'security' and the importance of paying more attention to political-economic mechanisms, including state/private actor relations.

It was also shared that the magnitudes of national economies are not really the main determining factors for the geoeconomic power of the nation. May come from the State's involvement in the key features of global networks and infrastructure. On the contrary, structural benefits may be created and enhanced in asymmetric global networks where the states that control highly connected nodes base their government's coercive power on the networks and the economic interdependence of actors acts as a source of their own. (Farrell and Newman, 2019). These arguments have been developed to include the role of governments in bringing technological competition into economic policy in more recent analyses. Salter (2025) explores the development of a new facet of economic statecraft in which technological futures, industrial possibilities and government interventions are increasingly entangled. From the literature references examined, the focus has turned towards state power being an influence on key networks, technologies and productive capacities in the modern world.

The other is 'transformation of globalization'. The concept of economic interdependence will not disappear with the growing tension in geopolitics; merely it can be organized and reconfigured and may have other strategic values. But Linsi and Gristwood (2024), using evidence of cross-border corporate investment, do not accord much importance to the "generalized withdrawal" from international economic integration that is thought to have occurred as a result of geopolitical rivalry. Their results suggest that the internationalisation process is on-going despite the increased political tension, but the nature of internationalisation has undergone transformations. Drawing on examples of economic statecraft diffusion, Yan and Su (2025) illustrate the influence it could have in rivaling States through such areas as building infrastructure and investment and regional economic planning. In this sense, these results suggest that the competition can not only put an end to the interdependent relationship, but may also lead to a new and different relationship. In addition, how to manage different types of economic relations is increasingly a key element in state power.

The interdependence and economic competition of countries

Geoeconomic analysis focuses on the interdependence of the economies as it is possible to have economic interdependence that is beneficial in one sense, while detrimental in another. Farrell and Newman (2019) shows interdependence between states and structure of a global network determines a distribution of power among states. In more centralized networks, there could be a potential opportunity for states in positions that count to influence networks and/or prevent access. The same feat has happened in the Middle East as well: Ahram (2022), who, as in the past, are able to apply the weapon of financial, commerce and communication networks as instruments of strategic pressure. This perspective problematizes the idea that economic interdependence always leads to cooperation, and questions the possibility of other political levers being created in an interdependent relationship with other.

Recent studies also reveal that strategic dependency vulnerabilities have become a key concern for states, and they are making concerted efforts to minimize them. To demonstrate that such a transition allowed to design trade and investment policy autonomous instruments that can conflict with EU competitiveness, security and development interests, Weinhardt and De Ville (2024) show how EU trade and investment policy has evolved in this period. Their own analysis indicates this differentiation of impacts between more and less developed economies, in the context of geoeconomic policies, according to the countries' economic features and their relationship with the primary markets. Freudlsperger (2024) covers the European Union's (EU) Anti-Coercion Instrument and the increasing occurrence of aspects that seek to address economic coercion in the sphere of trade policy. These developments will make greater the public evidence of a second current shift in the use of market access, investment regulation and trade instruments as controls on external (non-domestic) economic pressures.

The infrastructure, energy and critical-resource strategies are also gradually turning into realms of a so to say "strategic competition". The European Angles on infrastructure policy suggest that in 2024 it increasingly shifts to infrastructure on transnational value chain control and infrastructure on strategic value. European perspectives on infrastructure policy point to a growing concentration on transnational value chain control and on strategically important infrastructure like communication and energy in 2024. From their analysis it would be apparent that the infrastructure is being built for more than just economic considerations – geopolitical and competitive considerations are also being taken into account. Ufimtseva et al. (2024) focus on critical minerals and explore in-depth the possibility of using the components of domestic production policies, investment screening and forming alliances in the context of a comprehensive geoeconomic strategy. More competition is emerging, through the struggle for key resources, rather than technologies, infrastructures or supply chains—let alone armytags, the literature then shows.

Global impact and Geoeconomic instruments

Economy statecraft is a form of statecraft which provides several instruments for a government to best render their own means – i.e. the economy – useful for working against attaining their influence – i.e. outside of their boundaries. Breslin and Nesadurai (2023) distinguish three categories of goals that stimulate economic statecraft – a set of instruments for them – and set of effects which follow as a result of such policy. It's important because, though the planning has the potential to be economically viable, it may not have the potential to succeed in planning outcomes. The impact of geoeconomic instruments relies on a relationship between the objectives sought, the implementation of the policy, the policy's reaction by the target countries and the broader international situation. This is echoed by Zelicovich (2024), who presents comparative data on Latin America, regarding the different forms of economic statecraft, including the economic inducings, coercion and sanctions, strategic-asset policies and defensive measures.

In this wider context, technology has a newfound importance with its impact on national security and economic competitiveness. In the economic age of today, Salter (2025) maintains that the state is steadily getting into the business of technology development, and technology capacity shaping as an orchestrator. Likewise, as states act in response to their rival's infrastructure and investment projects, Yan and Su (2025) find that economic statecraft can extend to other regional rivals. This research concludes that 'grab control' of technological ecosystems, investment flow, infrastructure networks and standards in the states has become a key to determining the strength of the global influence nowadays. Hence, in addition to being concerned with trade diplomacy, there is other geoeconomics: the management of all kinds of new technologies and economic powers.

In the literature several important limitations and unintended consequences of geoeconomic strategies were also identified. Weinhardt and De Ville (2024) demonstrate that geoeconomic goals may clash with development goals, while Abels and Bieling (2024) find tensions between the strategic infrastructure goals and ecological, social and market aspects. Moreover, geoeconomic strategies are not exclusive to more powerful states, but can also be implemented by emerging or developing states through economic instruments, as Zelicovich (2024) shows. Collectively, these works show a field of study that is lacking in work on how the interaction of economic interdependence, strategic competition, and global influence can manifest itself in various layers of international systems. While other work exists that is informative for the individual instruments and regional cases, there would be value to a more integrated approach to understanding how states transform interdependence into strategic advantage and how they cope with interdependence vulnerabilities.

Research Methodology

Research Design

The study used a qualitative descriptive research design to explore geoeconomics' role in state power. The specific design was chosen as the study examined the functioning of economic

interdependence, strategic competition and global influence in the current international relations. The research did not measure relations, but examined documented relationships, policy or practices, and interaction among states. The focus was on economic measures like trade policy, investment policy, sanctions, financial entering barriers, technology controls, energy policy, and supply chain policy. The qualitative design also allowed the study to conclude what the instruments were used for and their implications within various geopolitical contexts.

Population of the Study

Populated the population with published policy and scholarly work on geoeconomics, economic statecraft, economic interdependence, strategic competition, and global influence. A number of research articles, academic books, institutional reports, policy materials, and other key secondary sources relevant to the research questions were included. The literature included studies on contemporary international economic relations, the issues of trade, investment, sanctions, financial systems, technology, critical minerals, infrastructure and supply chains. The special attention was paid to the materials mainly published in the recent period to highlight the changes taking place in the contemporary geoeconomic environment.

Sample and Sampling

The purposive sampling technique was adopted not to leave out any crucial secondary sources for detailed analysis, 30 secondary sources are considered relevant. The literature included peer-reviewed journal articles, scholarly publications and authoritative policy documents that explicitly referred to at least one of the study's focus issues. The relevance of the source, its academic reputation, methodical quality, and its role in understanding geoeconomic state power was the criteria used for selection. Some literature from other geographical and geopolitical locations was also included in the sample in order to avoid relying on literature from a particular country or region. Purposive sampling helped the researcher focus his effort on primary sources that provide substantive content on the related topics of economic interdependence, economic instruments for strategic competition and international influence.

Data Sources

The study was used secondary data only. Academic literature was gathered via academic databases and research websites (Google scholar, ResearchGate) and institutional evidence was gathered from trusted and well-regarded international research entities and policy institutions. A variety of non-fiction material such as peer-reviewed journal articles, academic research papers, policy reports, official documents and analytical publications were incorporated into the documentary material. The authors selected for coverage of sources' content were chosen because they related to the defense-related research questions and were useful for explaining the contemporary geoeconomic practices. Special emphasis was placed on recent literature to enable the study to stay current with world trade, technological competition, sanctions, investments policies, energy security, and strategic supply chains development.

Data Collection Procedure

The data has been gathered by systematic document search process. Relevant literature was identified based on keywords—including geoeconomics, economic statecraft, economic interdependence, strategic competition, state power, global influence, sanctions, trade policy, technological competition, and economic security. Secondly, the relevant sources were selected based on their relevance to the research goal. Third, the selected sources were analysed in order to obtain information on the goals, instruments, strategies and outcomes of geoeconomic policies. The researcher categorized the information retrieved on those 3 key dimensions of the study: economic interdependence, strategic competition, and global influence. This generated a typology of evidence which could then be themetized.

Data Analysis

Themes were identified using a thematic approach to the analysis of the collected material. A few key areas of the analysis were identification of common themes, classification of evidence, comparison of evidence across sources, and the provision of general themes based on the documentary content. The first analysis was concentrated on the nature and typological characteristics of economic interdependence and their interdependencies' vulnerabilities, including the dependence on the international markets, technology, resources and financial networks. The key concern in the second stage was strategic competition in the area of economic measures including sanctions, trade measures, investment screening, export controls and industrial policies. Finally, the focus was on the role these instruments played in a country's power and influence in the international sphere. Since the study has not involved numerical observations rather using qualitative documentary evidence, there was no correlation or regression analysis carried out.

Results and Analysis

The findings are based on the thematic analysis of 30 secondary sources, drawn from the purposive sample, which focused on geoeconomics, economic interdependence, strategic competition, economic statecraft and global influence. Using analysis, three main achievements of the research subjects were found, which were aligned with the objective of the research, namely economic interdependence and strategic leverage, geoeconomic instruments and strategic competition, and geoeconomics and global influence.

Table 1.Major Themes Identified from the Analysis of 30 Secondary Sources

Major Theme	Sources Identifying Theme	Percentage
Economic interdependence and strategic leverage	24	80.0%
Geoeconomic instruments and strategic competition	27	90.0%
Technology and critical supply chains	23	76.7%
Financial statecraft and sanctions	21	70.0%

Major Theme	Sources Identifying Theme	Percentage
Infrastructure, energy, and resource competition	20	66.7%
Global influence through economic partnerships	22	73.3%

Table 1 also demonstrates that the most common theme to appear across a broad number of sources analysed was geoeconomic instruments and strategic competition, present in 27 out of 30 (90.0%) sources. This finding suggested that the literature generally treated geoeconomics as an important means of foreign policy for achieving geopolitical goals. Restrictions on trade, sanctions, investment restrictions, export restrictions, industrial policies and economic partnerships were mentioned throughout the investigated literature. It was also a common subject, indicating that economic policy could increasingly be used together with security and diplomatic policies. The second most salient theme was economic interdependence and strategic leverage with 24 instances in the total sample which equates to 80.0% of the total. The literature reviewed revealed a mix of economic gains or strategic vulnerabilities associated with interdependence. States enjoyed access to foreign markets, investment, technologies, resource, and production chains, but they may be vulnerable to economic pressure from dependency on strategically important external suppliers and/or external markets. Results also pointed to the significance of technology, critical supply chains, financial statecraft, infrastructure, energy and economic partnerships. The technologies and critical supply chains were found 23 times (76.7%) in the sources, and the financial statecraft and sanctions were found 21 times (70.0%) in the sources. In 20 sources (66.7%), there was infrastructure, energy and resource competition, while global influence, through economic partnerships, was reported in 22 sources (73.3%). The results showed that modern geoeconomic competition was not limited to a particular industrial field, but was a multisector competitive process.




Figure 1 Major Themes Identified from the Analysis of 30 Secondary Sources

Economic Interdependence and Strategic Leverage

The first analytical theme examined how economic interdependence contributed to strategic leverage.

Table 2. Forms of Economic Interdependence Identified in the Selected Literature

Form of Interdependence	Sources	Percentage
Trade and market dependence	25	83.3%
Technology dependence	23	76.7%
Energy and resource dependence	21	70.0%
Financial dependence	19	63.3%
Supply-chain dependence	24	80.0%
Investment dependence	20	66.7%

Table 2 shows that trade and market dependence was the single most prevalent type of economic interdependence discussed, with 25 sources (83.3%) including a reference to it. The following ranked in importance was supply-chain dependence, with 24 sources (80.0%). Results showed that international trade and interdependent production systems were significant ways in which states became economically linked. Technological dependence was mentioned in 23 sources (76.7%) reflecting its increasing strategical significance for the development capabilities. The analysis revealed that new technologies gained in significance to become strategic assets instead of regular commercial products over time. State reliance on foreign technologies, components, software or special manufacturing facilities created potential vulnerabilities to desires for technological autonomy. A second area that was evident was dependence on energy and resources which had 21 sources (70.0%) addressing this dimension. The results identified a close connection between access to energy supplies and critical resources, especially when resources were located close together and were hard to replace. Financial dependence and investment dependence were seen in 19 (63.3%) and 20 (66.7%) of the sources, respectively. These rates were a bit lower than the percentages of trade and supply chain, but the analysis remained a very high strategic importance. Financial relationships may have an impact on access to funds, international markets, payment methods and investment possibilities. Foreign investment can be utilized for infrastructure development, economic development and may establish long-term relationships between States.

Geoeconomic Instruments and Strategic Competition

The second major theme focused on the instruments states used to transform economic capabilities into strategic influence.




Figure 2. Forms of Economic Interdependence Identified in the Selected Literature

Table 3. Geoeconomic Instruments Identified in the Selected Sources

Geoeconomic Instrument	Sources	Percentage
Trade restrictions	24	80.0%
Economic sanctions	22	73.3%
Export and technology controls	23	76.7%
Investment screening and restrictions	19	63.3%
Industrial policy	21	70.0%
Financial restrictions	20	66.7%
Infrastructure financing	18	60.0%
Economic partnerships and incentives	22	73.3%

Table 3 revealed that trade restrictions were most commonly mentioned geoeconomic measure (24 times, 80.0%). Export and technology controls came in second at 23 sources (76.7%) and economic sanctions and economic partnerships or incentives were tied at 22 sources (73.3%). From these findings it can be seen that the economic instruments employed by the states were strategic and restrictive instruments, and alternatively, strategic and cooperative instruments. In

general, the restrictive measures were linked with economic cost, access, restrictions on strategic commodities or limitations of the abilities of another. It also revealed a growing focus on technology and industrial policy. In 76.7% of the sources, export and technology controls were mentioned, and 70.0% of them mentioned industrial policy. This pattern suggested that technologies and productive facilities' protection and development were becoming an effective instrument of strategic competition. States tried to build up strategic sectors, and to minimize their reliance on foreign suppliers, and to safeguard sectors deemed critical for national security. In 19 sources (63.3 %), governments had investment screening and restrictions based on strategic considerations, indicating that governments also considered foreign investments in a context that went beyond traditional economic parameters. Two poles of financial constraints and infrastructure finance emerged in the context of geoeconomic competition. The effects of financial constraints were observed in 20 sources (66.7%), highlighting financial access as a strategic leverage. The importance of infrastructure financing was mentioned in 18 resources (60.0%), which suggests economic leverage is also possible via long-term investments and connections.




Figure 3. Geoeconomic Instruments Identified in the Selected Sources

Geoeconomics, Global Influence, and State Power

The third major theme examined the relationship between geoeconomic strategies and global influence.

Table 4. Mechanisms through Which Geoeconomic Strategies Supported Global Influence

Mechanism of Influence	Sources	Percentage
Expansion of trade partnerships	22	73.3%

Mechanism of Influence	Sources	Percentage
Foreign direct investment	20	66.7%
Infrastructure connectivity	19	63.3%
Technology cooperation	21	70.0%
Energy partnerships	18	60.0%
Financial and monetary influence	17	56.7%
Regional economic institutions	20	66.7%
Strategic supply-chain partnerships	21	70.0%

In Table 4, trade partnerships were the most common way identified for global economic dominance (22, or 73.3%). The two most popular technology cooperation items were strategic supply-chain partnerships in 70.0%. These pieces of information indicated that the state would be able to build up the strength of its international position by establishing extensive economic relationships and not only via coercive structure. The number of foreign direct investment sources was 20 (66.7%) and regional economic institutions was 20 (66.7%). A total of 19 sources (63.3%) mentioned infrastructure connectivity, indicating a medium degree of importance of investment and institutional links. Accordingly, the study indicated that investment can contribute to bolster economic relations by bringing the recipient economies closer to the outside world in the aspects of capital, infrastructure, production networks and markets. Regional institutions may also be able to serve as coordination forums for policy and economic integration. Energy partnerships were more commonly found in 18 sources (60.0%) and financial and monetary influence were more commonly found in 17 sources (56.7%). These mechanisms were less common than trade and technology, and were still significant points of geoeconomic power. The results suggested that energy relationships might play a role in forming strategic partnerships, and monetary and financial resources in capital availability and export/import.




Figure 4. Mechanisms Through Which Geoeconomic Strategies Supported Global Influence

Discussion

The results have demonstrated that geoeconomics had gradually gained its very own form of power as an important part of the power arsenal of the modern state, even if not as strong as others, at least it was becoming a strategic power with its own functions, bolstered by strategic control of economic interdependence. The results of research showed that a strategic element of "economic interdependence" was appraised by 80.0% of the sources. This was in keeping with recent academic research which has conceptualized geoeconomics as a nexus of economic activity, geopolitical competition and state power. Mohr and Trebesch (2025) highlight the importance of concepts such as trade, sanctions, international finance, geoeconomics risk and economic coercion in grasping the prevailing geoeconomics. Along the same lines, Babić et al. (2024) have identified the geoeconomic pivoting areas to be international trade, investment and technology. The outcomes thus indicated that the economic relationship took greater dimensions than those relating only to trade and sales but that there were also strategic opportunities and vulnerabilities in the relationship for states.

It also emerged that they are big weapons of strategic rivalry – trade measures, the sanctions, technology measures, industrial policies. More than 80.0% of source documents analysed and 76.7% of these documents show trade restrictions, while 76.7% of the source documents analysed include export control and/or technology control. These were the results of the growing importance of state in the sectors in which the corporation invests its resources, and which have an economic value. This tendency of the State taking a greater role in these strategically important areas was reflected in this result. This development amounted to a new economic statecraft approach, described by Aggarwal and Reddie (2025) as a quest for ensuring industrial security and supply via trade and investment instruments by the Nation-states. They also noted the growing economic policy/tech competition nexus. Among the most powerful weapons in the now expanding field of "geo-economics" were sanctions and embargoes (Mohr and Trebesch 2025). The present result, then, was the ever increasing role of economic policies and the traditional ones of diplomatic and security policies.

Another key facet of geoeconomic competition was also technology and critical supply chains. It was found that on the technology dependence, 76.7 % of selected sources had this dependence and eight of the selected sources had dependence with their supply chain (80.0 %). This pattern has been a precursor to the more recent work on technological competition in the age of the current geoeconomic revolution. Babić et al. (2024) in the prospective analysis of geoeconomic turn identified technological competition as one of the key elements of the geoeconomic turn. Strategic competition also drove the governments to weigh in on the technological industry and create policies designed to foster growth capabilities within the domestic nation and to manage the external dependency for technological industry (Aggarwal & Reddie, 2025). This has therefore indicated that the technological capability and control of the strategically important supply chains were becoming an increasingly essential part of state power.

The results also revealed that the geoeconomic strategies included more than coercion – including their infrastructure, investments, economic partnerships, and other economic ways of engaging. The principle of ‘economic partnerships’, and ‘infrastructure connectivity’ all featured in the majority of the received sources, at 73.3 % and 63.3 % respectively. The Sino-Japanese competition showcased recent examples of economic statecraft and competing influence through infrastructure finance and the development of partnerships. Chinese and Japanese infrastructure policies have led to competition on the funding of infrastructure and relationship between regions, Yan and Su (2025) concluded. It found an echo in the literature as a whole that further indicated that the geoeconomic turn was not just about restricting, it was also about investing, trading, building infrastructure and technological exchanges. The developments, according to Babić et al. (2024), have engaged not only the state actors but also non-state actors in international trade, investment and technology.

The results indicated that although the upswing of geoeconomic instruments indicates a strategic opportunity, too many geoeconomic instruments equals more policy tension. Economic relationships and investments, technological cooperation and infrastructure connectivity can enhance the world's connections, and on the other hand, it can trigger dependencies and vulnerabilities. Weinhardt and De Ville (2024) discovered that the geoeconomic shift of the EU's trade and investment policy led to an intertwining of geoeconomic and security agendas, geoeconomic and competitiveness agreements, and geoeconomic and development agendas. Similarly, in the burgeoning field of geoeconomics Mohr and Trebesch (2025) illustrated how economic tools relate to coercion, international finance, trade and geoeconomic risk and conflict.

Conclusion

As a result of this study, geoeconomics has become a significant weapon in the armories of most developed countries in the world in a context of growing interdependence and competition in the international economy. Results showed that economic linkages which promote the flow of goods, investment, technology, energy, financial and supply chain information can offer the potential of win/win and strategic leverage opportunities. Commercial links are being increasingly leveraged by states for more than just commercial interests: they are being exploited to grow strategic interests, build economic resilience, and enhance the power. The analysis identified the following other key instruments through which economic capabilities can be translated to economic influence: Trade restrictions, Sanctions, Technology controls, Investments policies, Industrial strategies, Financial measures and Infrastructure partnerships. The progress made in a manner is a testament to the entanglements of economic, technological and security issues in today's international relations arena. Ongoing research on geoeconomics is another example of work that brings economic tools and levers to bear on geopolitical competition such as trade, finance, sanctions, coercion and strategic technologies. Such knowledge can be further developed with longitudinal data, comparative country studies and empirical assessments of the impacts and yields of different geoeconomic strategies in terms of effectiveness and costs.

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