CONSTITUTIONALISM WITHOUT CONSTITUTIONAL CULTURE: CHALLENGES FOR DEVELOPING DEMOCRACIES

Abstract

In the general perception, constitutionalism seems to be related to the presence of a written constitution, separation of powers, judicial review, fundamental rights and democrats of any type of government. However, the actual incorporation of these principles does not always lead to a constitutional regime that functions. In countries with less established democracy, coexistence of constitutional institutions with practices that erode accountability and the fulness of independence and value of constitutional restraint. This paper explores the arguments put forward that constitutionalism does not just consist of a text – rather, a constitutional culture that supports constitutionalizing norms in the everyday political and institutional practice seems necessary. It examines and delves into the links between constitutional design, constitutional reality, the capacity of the state, democratic consolidation and democratic backsliding. Special emphasis is placed on the discrepancy between de jure constitutional promises and de facto political actions, the significance of institutional capacity-building, the significance of political and civic orientations, and the general fragility towards gradual erosion that constitutional systems face. But the paper suggests that what should be referred to as constitutional culture is a mixture of institutional practices and values, political traditions and expectations, social attachment and civic participation. The paper outlines structural and cultural hurdles that hinder constitutional guarantees from being effective means of restricting public power, with comparisons to other developing democracies, especially Pakistan. It states that durability of constitutionalism do not only depend on good constitutional design, but also on the institutional capacity, political will and civic constitutional literacy and commitment to the constitutional norms.