PAKISTAN BETWEEN THE U.S., CHINA, AND INDIA: BALANCING, HEDGING, AND MANAGED DEPENDENCY

Abstract

This article examines how much strategic autonomy Pakistan can gain and keep while the US and China compete. It uses ideas from structural realism. It also uses research on hedging, much of it drawn from Southeast Asia. Instead of treating autonomy as a slogan, the article treats it as something you can measure along a scale. In that frame, it argues that Pakistan's balancing is aimed at India. It is not aimed at the wider great power rivalry. The study says that US moves toward India have changed the game. In the past, Pakistan had room to bargain because others disputed where it should stand. Now that dispute has shrunk. As a result, Pakistan's outside balancing is narrowed to one main great power partner. The article then turns to hedging. It says Pakistan hedges through work with the IMF and through a multi-vector approach to foreign ties. It calls this hedging intentional. But it argues the effort does not match the level of reliance tied to the China-Pakistan Economic Corridor. In short, the hedging handles problems that show up. It does not fix the underlying setup that creates dependence. The conclusion links several limits that feed each other. The paper points to economic weakness and debt stress. It also notes that US pressure is more punitive than persuasive. It adds Chinese expectations. It keeps returning to the India issue as a driver. Together, these factors keep Pakistan's options tight. The article wraps up with a clear judgment. Pakistan's actions fit managed dependency more than strategic autonomy. Even with nuclear weapons, strong geography, and years of maneuvering, the state's freedom of action is still constrained by the structure around it.